Robert Axelrod: From Tit for Tat to political sycophancy

Close to 50 years ago, Robert Axelrod was a University of Michigan computer modeller who launched a competition that changed the social and political sciences. In 2026 he is challenging the idea that rational political advisers are necessarily better than sycophants. “We view rational sycophancy as potentially more dangerous,” says the 83-year-old social scientist. Peter Hulm reports on what Robert Axelrod has been up to since he first wrote about the professor in 2005 for Crosslines Global Report.
After Axelrod published The Evolution of Co-operation in 1984, one of the classics of Cold War political science, the Michigan Professor of Political Science found himself on the US National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control, working with a counterpart Soviet Group to explore new initiatives.
"One of its primary motivations was to help promote cooperation between the two sides of a bipolar world," he explained. "My hope was that a deeper understanding of the conditions that promote cooperation could help make the world a little safer."
"On the Soviet side," he recalls, "several senior defence intellectuals and scientists involved in arms-control policy reported that they read the book with interest, and had passed it around to their friends."
A political science colleague told Axelrod his book helped her negotiate with her husband during their divorce.

Robert Axelrod
Tit for Tat
Twenty years after Axelrod’s first publication on his theory, a reviewer described his approach as “extremely influential”. Robert Hoffmann, Lecturer in Industrial Economics in the University of Nottingham Business School, reported: “According to the Social Science Citation Index, his work had been quoted more than one thousand times by 1992 (Axelrod 1992) and more than 2500 times to date.”
Axelrod organized two competitions that showed “tit for tat” (cooperate at first, then copy whatever your opposite number does) was the most effective strategy in most situations.
At first, politics was the beneficiary of his practical recommendation. Then, in 1987, a biologist showed how sticklebacks used the strategy to achieve cooperation with other fish. It was a finding that struck at the heart of biological thinking of the time. E.O. Wilson's fashionable theories of sociobiology suggested we must look in our genes for the guide to our behaviour. Axelrod offered a strategic rather than genetic explanation.
In 1988 and 1989 Axelrod took part in meetings on conflict reduction in Uzbekistan and Estonia. In 1990 he received the U.S. National Academy of Science's new Award for Behaviorial Research Relevant to the Prevention of Nuclear War.
In 1995, as Yugoslavia fell apart, he addressed representatives of the warring factions at the invitation of the United Nations. His website adds: Axelrod has consulted and lectured on promoting cooperation and harnessing complexity for the United Nations, the World Bank, the U.S. Department of Defense, and various organizations serving health care professionals, business leaders, and K–12 educators.
The original competitions
Prior to moving to Michigan, his website records, Axelrod taught at the University of California, Berkeley (1968-74). He holds a BA in mathematics from the University of Chicago (1964), and a PhD in political science from Yale (1969). In 2014, he was awarded the National Medal of Science, the "nation's highest honour for scientific achievement and leadership.
Axelrod reported in 1980 on the competitions – using the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (each of two crimes can escape punishment by ratting on the other, unless both do) to see what ideas worked best. “The strategies were submitted by game theorists in economics, sociology, political science, and mathematics,” reported.

Anatol Rapoport
The mathematician Anatol Rapoport of the University of Toronto won the first tournament with the strategy he called “TIT FOR TAT”. It was tested again through a second round. This attracted 62 entries from computer hobbyists, evolutionary biologists, physicists and computer scientists. But all failed to beat Rapoport's formula.
Axelrod developed his research into seeing how co-operation emerges without a central authority; then he collaborated with the evolutionary biologist W.D. Hamilton on the implications in the life sciences, producing a paper which won a prize from the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
He reported on co-operation that developed without friendship or foresight in the trenches of World War I – and showed how it operated among bacteria.
The foreign policy shock
The Evolution of Co-operation was the sort of book you loaned out and never got back. The biologist Richard Dawkins, writing in a foreword used for every edition from 2006 onward, praised it for showing how "deep selfishness, pitiless indifference to suffering, ruthless heed to individual success" could lead to "something that is in effect, if not necessarily in intention, close to amicable brotherhood and sisterhood".
He advised anyone who would listen: "The world's leaders should all be locked up with this book and not released until they have read it."
For those who wanted morally based foreign policy, however, TIT for TAT was shocking. It had, Axelrod admits, a "slightly unsavory taste" because the strategy was so close to an eye for an eye. For others, it offered the bracing prospect that no moral issues were injected into the discussion.
It also offered a foreign policy rationale that was not based on getting an advantage over others. In the tournaments, the strategy never won any more points for its user than the other player.
"Indeed, it can't possibly score more than the other player in a game because it always let the other player defect first, and it will never defect more times than the other player does. It won, not by doing better than the other player, but by eliciting cooperation. [...] TIT FOR TAT does well by promoting the mutual interest rather than by exploiting the other's weakness."
And the lesson for moralists was finally cheering: "A moral person couldn't do much better."
Doing well at TIT FOR TAT
TIT FOR TAT, nevertheless, had some built-in limitations. Axelrod updated his ideas in The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-based Models of Competition and Collaboration (1997) Princeton, ISBN 0-691-01567-8 (US$58 but cheaper at amazon.com – starting at $15.93 in paperback with a new afterword). A Website (no longer active) offered his source code and documentation for the models he explored (in Visual Basic and Pascal).
So what were the problems he found in TIT FOR TAT?
First, in situations where a central authority can enforce community standards, there are alternatives to TIT FOR TAT, and once a feud starts it can continue indefinitely. In the real world, Axelrod recommended looking at a more forgiving formula than an eye for an eye.
He even offered four simple suggestions for doing well in TIT FOR TAT situations:
- Don't be envious.
- Don't be the first to defect.
- Reciprocate both co-operation and defection (you choose the rate).
- Don't be too clever.
Another shortcoming of TIT FOR TAT is that the strategy applies only in a two-person game, whose relevance to real life is not always apparent. Axelrod knew this and used it to provoke ideas rather than prove theories about how processes work.

Reading signals
One of the major questions the formula failed to tackle was: how do you read the signals from the other side. Or as Axelrod put it: "What happens when a player might misunderstand what the other did on the previous move or might fail to implement the intended choice?"
Some theorists said strategists should be generous. Others said players should demonstrate contriteness (a variation of the earlier concern with automatic response). Still others suggested switching strategies to reward and punishment.
Running his computer models with a postdoctoral Chinese student, Axelrod showed that generosity or contrition worked better than a Pavlovian strategy.
Norms game
Perhaps the key problem with TIT FOR TAT was the reverse side of its advantages: its mathematical underpinning. True, this showed how a simple formula could beat all other strategies in repeated tournaments, and indicated how cooperation could develop without anyone taking any conscious decisions or developing a long-term strategy, no matter what political journalists say about the problems of "failed states."
But TIT FOR TAT's emphasis on mathematical/logical/rational "motivations" ignored the social issues that Axelrod remembers running up against at 14 in carrying out a school project on crosstraining of police officers and firefighters in Evanston, Illinois.
Told by a firefighter at the local station, "I don't know much about it, but we're all against it down here," Axelrod recalls. "The response made a deep impression on me: it was possible to have an opinion based upon social influence rather than independent analysis."
Facing up to these issues became a major stream of Axelrod's work since 1984. He developed a "norms game" for more than two players that allowed them to punish individuals who did not cooperate. "It turned out that another twist was needed, lest all the cooperators be tempted to let someone else be the one to bear the costs of disciplining the non-cooperators," Axelrod reports.
He set off on a wide-ranging study on how to promote norms.
Better rules
Axelrod found some better decision rules. By adding a constraint that players would not make demands of a target that would find it cheaper to fight than pay (was this the Yugoslav situation pre-disintegration?), he found that individuals would do better than the others, and if everyone except one player uses the rule, the non-cooperating player fares worse than the others (perhaps an explanation for the growth of non-violent relations).
When everyone can interact with everyone else, however, there tends to be one dominant actor (as in the growth of 19th century sea power, Axelrod suggested). And if demands for tribute are made without regard to wealth, that is – if everyone fights (Yugoslavia again?) – two distinct clusters develop, one with almost all the wealth.
But if two adjacent players just make a 10 percent commitment to each other, they develop complete commitment (if they have no others), and both tend to prosper (as Ricardo suggested in economics).
Cultural diffusion
Axelrod's toughest battle to get his ideas across came with his simplest model of social interaction. He tried to study how culture spread on the basis of a standard theory about diffusion of innovations: that transfer of ideas occurs most frequently between individuals who are similar in certain attributes such as beliefs, education, social status and the like.
This might seem unexceptional stuff. Nevertheless, his computerized simulation of the idea that cultural features will spread from one individual or group in relation to the number of features they already have in common offered some surprising results (so surprising that Axelrod thought he might have made a computer programming error).
It also gave Axelrod numerous problems in getting it published by political scientists, sociologists or even conflict resolution specialists. A political reviewer complained of Axelrod's model: "No one makes choices. No one seeks to influence anyone else. Change has no costs, politically or economically. Cultural change occurs all-together in a community, with no leaders or laggards. In sum, politics are absent. It is [a model] that political scientists were educated to hate."
Impossible to predict
For Axelrod, of course, this was the whole interest of the simulation. Almost all previous models, mathematical or sociological, treated each feature of a culture independently of the others. He also worked on a model that did not require top-down cultural enforcement (such as that imposed by the church, Webster or Napoleon).
Unfortunately Axelrod's results did not produce more encouraging forecasts. Starting with units that had little in common with their neighbours, he found them settling down into a few (usually three) uniform regions that had nothing in common with the others. In retrospect, the origins of these "stable regions" (I think uniform rather than stable is the best description of these regions) could be seen early on in the simulation.
However, it was impossible to predict which of the many cultural regions would survive to term. In 14 percent of the runs he ended up with a single uniform region, and in 10 percent the result was more than six.
The most surprising result was that large territories end up with fewer regions than moderate-sized territories, and this has nothing do with the existence of boundaries.
Also, larger regions are more likely to "eat" smaller regions than the other way round (while in his earlier models, a small non-cooperative group can play havoc with cooperative arrangements unless the society practises TIT FOR TAT).
Even increasing the number of territories and time scale of the simulation showed the number of uniform regions declining from 10,000 to two.
Most of the time the struggle was between many compatible cultures for survival within their individual zones. Likewise, even when two cultural practices are equally attractive, the less common one is likely to vanish over time.
This pessimistic result does not require any theory of conscious effort at cultural domination to produce its figures. It also offers a caution against arrogant assumptions about surviving cultural practices: "The mere observation that a practice followed by a few people was lost does not necessarily mean either that the practice had less intrinsic merit or that there was some advantage in following a more common practice."
Another major counter-intuitive result was that the number of uniform regions decreases with the greater variety of cultural features (i.e. some seem doomed to extinction).
Polarization
Axelrod showed that polarization occurs even when the model's mechanism for change is convergence towards a neighbour. "Likewise, when cultural traits are highly correlated in geographic regions, one should not assume that there is some natural way in which those particular traits go together," he observes. "Intuition is not a very good guide to predicting what even a very simple dynamic model will produce."
Axelrod has finally solved another puzzle facing enthusiasts of his approach for the past 14 years. Four years after publication, his work had inspired more than 250 works, but Axelrod's further work was noted only in a 1988 paper. In fact, most of his articles appear in widely varying professional journals and specialist books, and as he observes, few people keep up with cuttingedge biology, computer algorithm, management and political science magazines all at once.
In 1997 Axelrod brought together his articles from 1986 on. He provided a beautifully organized introduction and commentary, and extensive help for those who want to do their own modelling. "It includes an analysis of strategies that evolve automatically, rather than by human intervention," he explained.
"It also considers strategies designed to cope with the possibility of misunderstandings between the players or misimplemenation of a choice. It then expands the basis of cooperation to more than a choice with a short-run cost and a possible long-run gain. It includes collaboration with others to build and enforce norms of conduct, to win a war or to impose an industrial standard, to build a new organization that can act on behalf of its members, and to construct a shared culture based on mutual influence. [...] It includes the conflicts between violators and enforces of a norm, the threats and wars among nations, competition among companies, contests among organizations for wealth and membership, and competing pulls of social influence for cultural change."
Hoffmann concluded his survey of 20 years’ work since The Evolution of Cooperation: “The literature has confirmed the sensitivity of Axelrod's results with respect to alternative initial simulation conditions. Axelrod's contribution lies in the identification of the factors that influence whether cooperation is possible. His work and subsequent literature have established a comprehensive menu of the conditions of cooperation. This general framework is applicable to a host of realistic scenarios both in the social and natural worlds.”
Sycophancy
In working continuing until 2026, Axelrod reversed the idea. Instead of TIT FOR TAT, he has been studying sycophancy, pretty much the opposite of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. “Avoiding sycophancy may be more difficult than previously thought,” he reported in a paper with Scott E. Page of California entitled “Rational sycophants and catastrophic risks”, 26 May 2026, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), and also on his website.
It’s clear how relevant the issue is today: “Leaders such as Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Donald Trump have all been characterized as overly reliant on sycophants.” Political organizations are more prone to sycophancy than corporate or non-profit sectors, they suggest [Discuss].
The reason? “Political leaders generally choose their cabinet members and senior advisors, whereas in the corporate and nonprofit sectors board members often either select or approve senior leaders.”
What particularly concerns the university teachers is the influence of what they call rational sycophants: “A rational sycophant tells the leader what the leader wants to hear based on explicit cost–benefit calculations. This differs from a traditional (psychological) sycophant who is someone prone to the use of flattery to curry favor or gain influence.
Sycophancy in history
They note: “Many historical examples of failed decisions are partly explained by sycophantic advisors not challenging leaders. Examples include the Challenger disaster, the failed US war effort in Vietnam, IBM's failure to enter the personal computer market, Volkswagen's decision to approve tampering with exhaust systems to meet emissions standards, and GM's decision to stick with a flawed ignition switch design. In each case, advisors who were aware of potentially harmful outcomes did not speak out.”
Sycophancy today
Rational sycophancy, with its mathematical underpinning, may sound like wise council to a decision-maker, Axelrod and Page argue. “Evidence shows that by increasing leader confidence, sycophants make leaders less inclined to take necessary strategic actions. The tendency of AI to provide answers people desire, has also been shown to promote overconfidence.
All it requires for an adviser simply to calculate the mathematical returns of one option rather than another without considering its impact on society. “Catastrophic outcomes are more likely in the modern interconnected world in which actions by state and nonstate actors can disrupt the stability of large systems - financial markets, power grids, information infrastructure, and ecosystems. States can support or allow research that could release pathogens resulting in a pandemic,” they warn.
Throughout his career, Axelrod has taken effort to make his research understandable to a non-technical audience – and has been criticized for allowing explainers to oversimplify his findings. But Hoffmann finds nothing to criticize in his writings.
However, his specialization in computers and political science slowed his recognition among academics who were not mathematically educated. Perhaps his long career across many disciplines will speed the acceptance of the dark conclusions of his latest research.
Deputy Editor Peter Hulm is a long-time journalist who has worked with many UN institutions and non-government organizations including the World Economic Forum on development and environmental issues as well as for news and analytical outlets. He has a PhD in Media and Communication from what is now the Philosophy, Art and Critical Thought division of the pioneering European Graduate School and acts as its adviser on innovative journalism.
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